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Abstract 
A shortage of nurses is currently a problem in several countries, and an important 
question is therefore how one can increase the supply of nursing labour. In this paper 
we focus on the issue of nurses leaving the public health sector by utilising a unique 
data set containing information on both the supply and demand side of the market. To 
describe the exit rate from the health sector we apply a semi-parametric hazard rate 
model. In the estimations we correct for unobserved heterogeneity by both a 
parametric (Gamma) and a non-parametric approach. We find that both wages and 
working conditions have an impact on nurses’ decision to quit. Furthermore, failing to 
correct for the fact that nurses’ income partly consists of compensation for 
inconvenient working hours results in a considerable downward bias of the wage 
effect. 
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quitting propensities of nurses at 34 Norwegian hospitals. The nurses are tracked for a 
period of 5 years, from 1993 to 1997. The analysis shows that increased wages 
significantly reduces the probability that a nurse will leave the hospital sector. The 
decision to stay or leave is also affected by other job related factors like work load and 
shift work. 
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Introduction 
A shortage of nurses is a problem in several countries. In Norway the Directorate of 
Labour estimated the nursing shortage to comprise around 3300 whole-time posts in 
1998. In the UK recent estimates of the national vacancy rate for nurses are close to 15 
000 [1], and according to Ahlburg and Mahoney [2], hospitals in the US have problems 
with high vacancy rates among registered nurses. Nurses are key personnel in the 
health sector, and in some cases, staff shortages have caused ward closures in 
Norwegian hospitals. Even though these are extreme examples, sufficient supply of 
nurses is vital in order to secure a well functioning health service. Clearly, an increase 
in the labour supply of nurses is a policy relevant question and in this paper we focus 
on one important side of this issue, namely why nurses leave the health sector.  
In order to improve nurse retention, focus has been on working conditions and 
wages. However, little economic research has been done in analysing how these factors 
influence nurses’ quitting behaviour. Two studies (Ahlburg and Mahoney [2] and 
Schumacher [3]) focus on how wages affect the retention of nurses. Both studies find 
that wages have significant, but small, effects. This finding leads Ahlburg and 
Mahoney [2] to conclude; «Why nurses leave the profession may have more to do with 
conditions of employment than with wages». Shields and Ward [4] investigate the 
importance of job satisfaction in determining nurses’ intention to quit. As opposed to 
the two other studies, they have a data set that makes it possible to investigate the 
effect of wages and a large number of factors influencing nurses’ working conditions. 
They find that poor career advancement opportunities, increased workload, wage and 
workplace relations are the most important factors in determining quitting intentions. 
However, a problem with this approach is that the intention to quit could be just 
another way of expressing dissatisfaction. It is therefore not clear how much is 
explained by examining this correlation [5].  
The aim of the present study is to assess the effect of wages and working 
conditions on nurses’ probability of leaving the public health sector. We utilise a 
unique data set containing information on both the supply and demand side of the 
market. Our sample consists of female nurses working in Norwegian hospitals. To 
characterise the exit rates we use a proportional hazard model with a nonparametric 
baseline hazard. We correct for unobserved heterogeneity using parametric (gamma) 
and semi-parametric techniques. In several important ways the study differs from most 
previous studies on nurses’ retention and turnover.  
First, we take into account that one of the most important characteristics of the 
nursing profession is the large amount of shift work. For most individuals, shift work 
is more stressful than working normal hours [6]. Therefore, shift work may be an 
important determinant of nurses’ retention. Another important reason to correct for 
shift work is that failing to do so might lead to a downward bias on the wage effect. 
The problem arises as a result of how the wage variable is normally constructed. 
Nurses who work shifts will have incomes partly consisting of compensation for 
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inconvenient working hours. If we divide the total income by the number of hours 
worked, we in effect get an average hourly wage. In this case a high wage might be the 
result of compensation for work outside normal hours. If shift work were considered a 
disadvantage, the effect of shift work would increase the exit rate. By including a 
covariate in our regression that measures the degree of shift work, we remove the 
effect of shift work from the wage variable, thus preventing an underestimated wage 
effect.  
Second, our study departs from most other studies in this area in that we use 
data where we have information on hospitals as well as extensive individual 
information. This makes it possible to include in our analyses several objective 
measures on nurses’ working conditions, together with other more general 
descriptions of the hospitals.  
Third, using administrative data compared to survey data has some obvious 
advantages. Rather than relying on individual retrospection, the researcher is able to 
construct case histories based on information collected for bureaucratic reasons. 
Individuals will less precisely recall some exactly recorded information, such as 
earnings and hours worked. The presence of measurement error in survey data is 
confirmed in many studies, e.g. Poterba and Summers [7] and Bollinger [8]. Also, 
problems resulting from sample dropouts that are often encountered in surveys are to 
a large extent avoided.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the study 
and provides summary statistics, while the econometric specification is discussed in 
section 3. In section 4 the results from the regressions are reported, and we conclude 
the paper in section 5. 
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Data 
Our data set consists of administrative data from different sources. Information on 
wages, occupation and working time is taken from the Norwegian Association of Local 
and Regional Authorities (NALRA) personnel register. This register includes 
information on all individuals working in the health sector in Norwegian counties and 
municipalities. Since one of our aims in this paper is to study nursing retention using 
both individual and firm specific data, we had to exclude from our sample individuals 
working in the health services in the local councils. The reason is that our data does not 
provide institutional information about local municipalities. We therefore restrict our 
analysis to trained nurses working in hospitals.  
Except for five specialised private hospitals representing less than 1 percent of 
the total number of hospital beds [9], hospitals in Norway are primarily in the public 
sector. Two large hospitals, the National Hospital of Norway (Rikshospitalet) and the 
National Cancer Hospital (Radiumhospitalet), and a few small and highly specialised 
hospitals are owned by the national health authorities. The counties own other public 
hospitals, and this means that most major Norwegian hospitals report information to 
the NALRA register. However, data from the different hospitals may vary in terms of 
detail. Most importantly, about 40 percent of the hospitals do not provide information 
on the degree of shift work among the nurses. As this aspect of the job presumably is 
an important determinant for whether a nurse leaves the public health sector, we 
exclude individuals working in these hospitals from our sample. Our sample then 
consists of nurses working in 34 different hospitals. To assess how representative the 
sample is, we compare the 34 hospitals in our sample to all the hospitals in the NALRA 
register (58). Table 1 shows that the means and standard deviations of the variables are 
quite similar for county and local hospitals. For university hospitals the differences are 
larger, but the means are not statistically different by a t test. This indicates that the 34 
hospitals constitute a fairly representative sample. 
  
(Table 1 about here) 
 
After dropping individuals with missing observations, our final sample consists of 
5284 nurses registered as working in a hospital on 1 January 1993. The reason why we 
use a stock sample is mainly due to different reporting practices in the hospitals. Some 
hospitals report the date the actual job starts, while others report the first date the 
individual starts working for the county. This makes it difficult to decide the exact start 
of a spell. 
Previous labour market research has shown that males and females behave quite 
differently in the labour market, and we therefore restrict our analysis to female 
nurses. In Norway most nurses are eligible to early retirement at the age of 62. Because 
we did not want to include in the sample persons who leave nursing due to early 
retirement, women older than 57 are excluded from the analyses. We have data for the 
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years until 1997, inclusive, and can therefore track the individuals for a maximum 
period of five years.  
As our focus is on the transition out of the public health sector, nurses who leave 
a hospital job for work in the local council health service are treated as censored. 
Nurses who leave a job in one hospital for a job in a new hospital, are treated in two 
different ways depending on whether the new hospital is in the NALRA register or 
not. If a county owns the new hospital and the hospital provides full information to the 
NALRA register, the new job is treated as a continuation of the former job. If, on the 
other hand, the new hospital is not in the NALRA register, or the hospital does not 
provide full information to the register, these observations are treated as censored. In 
total, the number of censored individuals is 669. 
Two types of events are defined as transitions out of the public health sector. 
Firstly, a nurse is registered as leaving the health sector if the spell ends in a transition 
out of the labour force, and she stays out of the labour force for at least one year. The 
reason for using a period of one year is to avoid recording a transition for nurses who 
are on leave. In the public sector, educational and casual leave is normally given for a 
maximum period of one year, while the maternity leave is of maximum 52 weeks. 
Secondly, if the nurse is registered as starting a job outside the public health sector, a 
transition out of nursing is recorded. In total this gave 854 transitions, which means 
that 16.2 percent of the nurses left the public health sector during the five year period. 
The number of transitions and censorings in each time period is reported in Table 1 of 
the appendix. 
The data from the NALRA register does not include information about children 
and spouse characteristics, or on hospitals or place of residence. We have therefore 
merged these data with data from Statistics Norway. Table 2 provides definitions and 
descriptive statistics for the covariates used in the analysis. The covariates are all time 
dependent but only change value once a year.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Hourly wages are calculated using basic income and all bonuses. Bonuses include 
compensation for evening, night and weekend duties and overtime. We have argued 
that the degree of shift work probably is an important determinant for retention. 
However, we do not have information on the actual number of hours worked outside 
normal hours. As an approximation we use the variable «share bonuses». This is the 
share of total monthly income that a nurse receives as compensation for shift work, and 
we believe that this variable is a very close substitute for the exact magnitude of 
individual shift work.  
We divide the nurses in the sample into three categories. Nursing specialists are 
nurses with at least one year of specialist training, in for instance anaesthesia, surgery 
or intensive care. Leading nurses are nurses who are in charge of a hospital ward or a 
larger hospital unit. Staff nurses constitute the last category.  
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Centrality indicates the geographical position of the municipality in relation to 
larger urban settlement. The classification it is based on travelling time to a centre 
where a higher order of central functions is found [10]. «Centrality level 1» consists of 
the least central municipalities, whereas the most central municipalities are found in 
«Centrality level 4». 
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Model specification   
As in many studies on turnover and retention [11, 12], we apply a hazard rate 
approach in this paper. To study what affects nurses’ propensity to leave the public 
health sector, we use a semi-parametric estimation procedure. As opposed to a 
parametric approach, such as a Weibull specification, in this method it is unnecessary 
to make parametric assumptions concerning the hazard’s time dependency. This has 
the advantage that it prevents inconsistent estimation of the coefficients due to a 
misspecified baseline hazard, and it also provides a non-parametric estimate of the 
baseline hazard. 
Our sample consists of the stock of nurses employed in a hospital on 1 January 
1993. This implies that nurses in our sample are likely to have longer average spell 
lengths than nurses in the population. The reason is that nurses who have stayed in 
work for, say, the last ten years before 1993 will be present in our sample, while nurses 
who have quitted during the same time period will not. Therefore the likelihood 
function requires conditioning on survival at least until 1 January 1993. However, as 
shown by Allison [13] and Jenkins [14], this conditioning is easily done in a discrete-
time hazard model. 
We divide the calendar time into three-month periods. Since we observe our 
sample until 31 December 1997, this gives twenty periods of observation. Let t=t  
index the first period (the sampling period). Period 1=t  is the period a nurse starts 
working in a hospital, where t£1 . Further, we define 1=id  for nurses who leave the 
public health sector during our observation period and 0=id  for those still in the 
public health sector after twenty periods. For nurses who quit we denote the length of 
the current spell is  so ist += t  is the calendar time of the spell end. Otherwise is  
denotes the period of censoring. 
The discrete-time hazard rate is the probability that a nurse leaves the health 
sector in period t, conditional on survival until this period: 
 
( );|prob tTtTh iiit ³==                                                                                                      (1) 
 
where iT  is a discrete variable representing the time at which the spell ends. The 
probability of surviving any period after having survived the preceding period is 
( )ith-1 . Therefore the total likelihood contribution of a nurse with exit in period is  is: 
( ) ( ) ( )Õ Õ
-
=
+-
=
+ --=+=
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hhhsT                                                                    (2) 
 
To get the likelihood contribution for a nurse who is only observed from period t  to 
period is , as is the case in our sample, we have to condition on survival up to period 
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Then the conditional probability of observing a nurse with an exit becomes: 
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In the same way the conditional probability of observing a nurse with no exit during 
twenty periods of observation is: 
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Because of this «cancelling» of terms, the likelihood contribution depends only on 
hazard rates and data for the periods actually observed. By defining a variable 1=ity  
if ist += t  and 1=id , and 0=ity  otherwise, the likelihood function becomes:  
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To estimate this model we have to choose a specification for the hazard rate. A 
commonly used specification is the complementary log-log (extreme value). This 
specification has the advantage that it may be derived from the continuous-time 
proportional hazards model [14]. Introducing explanatory variables, this model is 
 
( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ] ( ) itititit thßth XX '1loglog'expexp1 bqq +=--Û+--=                                  (6)     
 
where itX  is a vector of possibly time-varying cavariates, b  is a coefficient vector and 
( )tq  provides the parameterisation of the baseline hazard. As mentioned earlier, we 
choose a flexible semi-parametric form for the baseline hazard, where ( )tq  is 
represented by dummy variables for each time period of the sample. 
One important assumption so far has been that all heterogeneity is due to 
observed variables. It is well established that failures to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity could produce a downward bias in the estimate of the baseline hazard, 
and also bias the parameter estimates for the covariates (Lancaster [15]). To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model, we assume that an unobserved random 
variable ie , which is time constant and independent of the observed covariates, enters 
the hazard. Eq. (6) then becomes: 
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( )[ ] ( ) iitit th ebq ++=-- X'1loglog                                                                                        (7)                                                                    
 
Estimation of this model (often called frailty or mixture model) requires an explicit 
assumption about the distribution of this unobserved variable. In most applications a 
gamma distribution is chosen. This distribution is convenient because the probability 
density function yields a closed form expression for the likelihood [16]. 
Heckman and Singer [17] suggest a semi-parametric alternative where the 
unknown distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term is approximated by a 
discrete multinomial distribution. The mass points and corresponding probabilities of 
this distribution can be jointly estimated with other parameters of the model. 
Estimating the discrete number of mass points, J, is complicated, and we adopt the 
practical approach to estimate the model for increasing values of J until the likelihood 
fails to increase. To estimate the two heterogeneity models, we used Stata programs 
written by Jenkins [18] and Rabe-Hesketh [19]. 
Finally, it should be noted that correcting for unobserved heterogeneity in a stock 
sample implies that the assumptions regarding the distribution of the error term ie  
must be with respect to the sample and not with respect to the population [20, 14].  
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Results 
Before we discuss the effect of covariates on the duration hazard, a look at some 
nonparametric estimates is also instructive. In the analysis the time scale is divided into 
three-month intervals. Therefore the first point on the graphs corresponds to the 
transition probability in January, February and March, the second point to the 
transition probability in April, May and June, and so forth. In Figure 1 we have plotted 
the Kaplan-Meier hazard rate. Seemingly there are some seasonal differences in the 
risk of leaving nursing. A possible explanation for the relative high risk in the period 
July, August and September could be that nurses quit in connection with their summer 
holyday.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
In Figure 2 we have plotted the estimated baseline hazards for the model with no 
correction for unobserved heterogeneity, and for the model with Gamma correction. 
Since the baseline hazard for the model with non-parametric correction almost exactly 
overlapped the graph for the model with Gamma correction, this is not plotted. We 
notice that the shape of the baseline hazard resembles the Kaplan-Meier estimates but 
the baseline hazards are much lower than the empirical hazard rate. Looking at the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates, the overall hazard rate seems to exhibit negative duration 
dependence. However, it is well known that not correcting for heterogeneity (observed 
and unobserved) leads to incorrect results in duration analysis due to the fact that the 
proportion of «stayers» in the risk set increases over time [15]. Even if this problem 
should be less pronounced when using a stock sample, we see that introducing 
heterogeneity flattens the baseline hazards. 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
In Table 3 we present results of importance for model selection. The Gamma 
heterogeneity model can be compared with the model without heterogeneity by testing 
the significance of the variance parameter in the Gamma distribution, or by a 
likelihood ratio test. The estimated Gamma variance has a t-ratio of 3.24 and the LR 
statistic is 15.15. Thus both tests indicate that introducing Gamma heterogeneity into 
the model improves the model fit significantly. The model with non-parametric 
heterogeneity is estimated using two mass-points. Introducing a third mass point in 
the model resulted in only a marginal increase in the likelihood value. We therefore 
conclude that the unobserved heterogeneity can be best explained by a two-point 
distribution of the stayer-mover type. The estimated support points were –0.45 and 
2.25 with associated probability masses of 0.84 and 0.16, respectively. This model can 
also be compared to the model without heterogeneity by a LR test. In this case we get a 
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LR statistic of 16.28, implying that the model with no heterogeneity correction is again 
rejected. Since the two heterogeneity models are mutually non-nested, we use the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for model 
selection. As shown in table 3, the Gamma model is the preferred model, and in what 
follows we discuss these results. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The effects of covariates on the duration hazard are reported in Table 4. We find that 
the exit rate from the public health sector decreases in wages. An increase in the wage 
by 1 NOK decreases the hazard by 3.4 percent for staff nurses. The interactions 
«Wage*Nursing specialist» and «Wage*Leading nurse» demonstrate that the wage 
effect is somewhat smaller for these groups. As expected the exit rate increases in the 
degree of shift work («Share bonuses»). The relatively large positive effect indicates 
that a specification without this variable will result in a biased estimate of the wage 
effect. As an informal test we estimated the model with Gamma heterogeneity without 
«Share bonuses». With this specification a marginal increase in the wage will decrease 
the hazard for staff nurses by only 1.6 percent, which clearly demonstrates that 
ignoring shift work has a large unwarranted impact on the wage effect. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Most previous studies find that tenure and the probability of quitting are inversely 
related. An explanation for this could be that longer tenured employees have more 
firm specific human capital invested in the organisation and therefore are more 
reluctant to leave the organisation than those with less tenure. In this study we do not 
use a direct measure of tenure, but years of experience. Tenure and experience are in 
general highly correlated, however, and as expected we find that experience decreases 
the hazard rate out of nursing. The age effect works in the opposite direction. Nurses 
have a higher exit rate the older they are. The probability of exit is decreasing with age, 
however, with a turnaround at an age of 41 years.  
Our findings further indicate that the propensity to leave nursing is non-linear in 
working hours. Nurses in full time positions constitute the reference category, and 
compared to them nurses in half-time positions or less («Part time 1») have higher exit 
rates. Nurses in the categories «Part time 2» and «Part time 3» seem to have lower exit 
rates than those working full time.  
Some recent studies have focused on the effect of working conditions on job 
satisfaction, and also on how job satisfaction determines nurses’ exit pattern [4, 21]. 
These studies typically find that poor working conditions, by affecting job satisfaction, 
constitute major contributors to turnover among nurses. Since we use register data in 
this study, we do not have information on self-assessed working conditions or job 
satisfaction. We believe, however, that hospital specific variables like «Occupancy 
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rate», «Beds per nurse» and «Length of stay» constitute objective measures on the 
working conditions of the respective hospitals. It is reasonable that high occupancy 
rates, as well as relatively many hospital beds per nurse, lead to lower job satisfaction 
due to stress, while the length of stay influences job satisfaction in the opposite 
direction. Since these variables are constant within hospitals, however, they cannot 
fully substitute for individual data. Neither do these variables take outpatient activities 
into account. As expected we find that nurses working at hospitals with high 
occupancy rates or a relatively large number of hospital beds per nurse are more 
inclined to leave nursing than other nurses. In hospitals where patients stay for a 
relatively long period, the exit rates from nursing are lower than elsewhere. Turning to 
the other hospital related variables, we find that nurses working in a local hospital 
have a significantly lower exit rate than those working in a university/regional 
hospital or a county hospital. After controlling for type of hospital, there seems to be a 
tendency that nurses working in large hospitals (measured as number of beds) leave 
nursing at a higher rate than nurses working in smaller hospitals.  
It is also interesting to notice that introducing interactions on wage have a large 
impact on the estimated exit rates of different skill categories. In a model without 
interactions (not reported) we find higher exit rates for nursing specialists and leading 
nurses. However, after correcting for wages having different effects on different groups 
of nurses, it turns out to be the case that nursing specialists and leading nurses have 
considerably lower exit rates. 
Turning to the family related variables, we find somewhat unexpectedly that 
nurses having children younger than 7 years of age do not have a significantly higher 
hazard rate out of nursing than others. A possible explanation for this could be that the 
relatively flexible labour market for nurses makes it possible to reduce the labour 
supply for a period, instead of quitting. Nurses with children older than 7 years seem 
to have lower exit rates than nurses without older children. These results therefore 
indicate that having children act as a stabilising influence on nurses’ job mobility. The 
same holds true for marriage. Married nurses seem to have a lower exit rate out of 
nursing than unmarried nurses. As expected, non-labour income works in the opposite 
direction. Our results indicate that both capital income and spouse’s income increase 
the exit but the effect of these variables are rather small in magnitude.  
For interpretation of the results it should be noted that we only analyse a single 
spell for each nurse in our sample. Nurses who have left a hospital (due to censoring or 
exit) might return to the initial state at a later time. However, this problem goes beyond 
the scope of a single spell model. Therefore, we cannot necessarily interpret the results 
as the «total risk» of leaving the public health sector within the observation period.  
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Conclusions 
The aim of this study has been to contribute to a better understanding of nurses’ 
decision to leave the public health sector. The public debate has focused on the 
importance of wages and working conditions as relevant policy tools and we discuss in 
particular whether these factors can reduce the number of nurses leaving the 
profession. We focus on nurses working in hospitals and estimate single spell duration 
models with unobserved heterogeneity to describe the exit process. Our sample comes 
from a large administrative data set containing detailed information on both 
individuals and hospitals.  
Working conditions are measured by hospital specific variables indicating 
nurses’ workload. Nurses working at hospitals with a high occupancy rate or a 
relatively large number of hospital beds per nurse have higher exit rates than other 
nurses. In hospitals where patients stay for a relatively long period, the exit rates are 
lower than elsewhere.  
Previous economic research finds small effects of wages on nursing retention. 
These results indicate that solving the excess demand by increasing wages might be 
expensive, if not impossible. In this study, however, we show that previous studies 
probably underestimate the wage effect because they do not correct for the fact that 
nurses’ income partly consists of compensation for shift work. In our particular data 
set, failing to correct for shift work led to an underestimated wage effect of more than 
50 percent. Thus, wages as well as working conditions seem to be important in keeping 
nurses in the profession. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Sample hospitals compared to all hospitals in the NALRA register. 
 University/central                 
hospitals 
County hospitals       Local hospitals 
   Sample Population   Sample Population   Sample Population 
Number of beds 451.1 
(236.1) 
574.1 
(158.5) 
138.0 
(81.6) 
142.9 
(110.5) 
77.4 
(35.7) 
77.3 
(30.1) 
Beds per nurse 0.88 
(0.11) 
0.83 
(0.10) 
0.94 
(0.17) 
0.90 
(0.13) 
1.00 
(0.30) 
1.09 
(0.30) 
Number of nurses 541.2 
(284.7) 
613.4 
(277.7) 
153.5 
(99.4) 
152.8 
(91.1) 
87.4 
(56.1) 
85.6 
(54.0) 
Length of stay 6.44 
(0.84) 
6.53 
(0.70) 
6.19 
(0.85) 
6.29 
(0.83) 
5.65 
(0.49) 
5.72 
(0.60) 
Occupancy rate 0.89 
(0.08) 
0.88 
(0.07) 
0.80 
(0.09) 
0.79 
(0.08) 
0.85 
(0.14) 
0.84 
(0.13) 
N 8 18 14 19 12 21 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.  
Variable name                                      Definition                                          Mean      S.D 
 
Wage Hourly wage including all bonuses (public holiday 
bonus, late duty bonus, etc.) in NoK 
144.17 23.35 
Share bonuses Share of the wages that are bonuses due to late, 
night and weekend duties.  
11.18 7.34 
Position Respondent  working as:   
 Staff nurse 0.54 0.50 
 Nursing specialist 0.33 0.47 
 Leading nurse 0.13 0.34 
Centrality: Measures a municipality’s geographical position 
related to the nearest centre with central functions 
  
 Centrality level 1 (least central) 0.12 0.32 
 Centrality level 2 0.11 0.31 
 Centrality level 3 0.39 0.49 
 Centrality level 4 0.38 0.49 
Years of experience  Years with income above basic counting unit in 
pension system (NoK 37033 in 1993) 
16.22 6.36 
Age Respondent’s age in 1993 36.76 7.93 
Age2 Age squared 1724.1 647.7 
Part time / Full time Respondent working:   
 Part time 1      (0 – 0.5 percent of full time) 0.22 0.41 
 Part time 2      (0.51 – 0.75 percent of full time) 0.27 0.44 
 Part time 3      (0.76 – 0.99 percent of full time) 0.10 0.29 
 Full time 0.41 0.50 
Capital income Capital income respondent and spouse/1000 NoK 16.18 101.69 
Spouse income Spouse’s gross income/1000 NoK 193.16 173.49 
Children > 7 1 if the respondent has children older than 7, 0 
otherwise 
0.29 0.45 
Children < 7 1 if the respondent has children younger or equal 
to 7, 0 otherwise 
0.41 0.49 
Married 1 if the respondent is married or cohabitant with 
children, and 0 else 
0.71 0.45 
Hospital type: Respondent working at a:   
 University/central hospital 0.53 0.50 
 County hospital 0.31 0.46 
 Local hospital 0.16 0.37 
Number of beds Total number of beds set-up and staffed for use 357.58 281.66 
Length of stay Total inpatient days/number of beds 6.27 0.87 
Occupancy rate Total inpatient days*100/effective beds*365 0.86 0.09 
Beds per nurse Total number of beds last year/total number of 
nurses last year 
0.84 0.15 
Sample size   5284 
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Table 3. Model selection. 
 
 No heterogeneity Gamma 
heterogeneity 
 
Non-parametric 
heterogeneity 
Gamma variance  2.88 (3.24)  
Mass point 1   probability   0.84 (5.99) 
                        value   -0.45 (-2.76) 
Mass point 2   probability   0.16 
                        value   2.25 
Information criteria tests:    
AIC1 8900.1 8886.4 8889.2 
BIC1 9330.8 9326.5 9348.0 
Log- likelihood -4404.03 -4396.21 -4395.60 
1 AIC = -2 log(L) + 2K , BIC = -2log(L) + K log (N ), where L, K and N are the maximised likelihood, 
number of parameters and number of observations, respectively.  
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Table 4. Proportional hazard model with non-parametric baseline hazard. Maximum likelihood estimates. 
                                                           No heterogeneity                            Gamma heterogeneity                  Non-parametric heterogeneity                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Variable                          Hazard ratio  95% Conf. interval        Hazard ratio     95% Conf. interval      Hazard ratio     95% Conf. interval      
Years of experience  0.9276*** 0.9085 – 0.9471 0.9032*** 0.8753 – 0.9321 0.9061*** 0.8803 – 0.9325 
Age 1.2064*** 1.0954 – 1.3286 1.2880*** 1.1285 – 1.4700 1.2604*** 1.1101 – 1.4310 
Age2 0.9977*** 0.9965 – 0.9989 0.9970*** 0.9954 – 0.9986 0.9972*** 0.9957 – 0.9987 
Wage 0.9731*** 0.9664 – 0.9799 0.9659*** 0.9576 – 0.9743 0.9658*** 0.9578 – 0.9740 
Wage*Nursing specialist 1.0064* 0.9990 – 1.0141 1.0062 0.9973 – 1.0152 1.0069 0.9979 – 1.0159 
Wage*Leading nurse 1.0146*** 1.0054 – 1.0240 1.0176*** 1.0063 – 1.0290 1.0175*** 1.0063 – 1.0289 
Share bonuses 1.0464*** 1.0262 – 1.0670 1.0620*** 1.0370 – 1.0877 1.0614*** 1.0372 – 1.0861 
Part time 1a 1.2472** 1.0221 – 1.5220 1.4554*** 1.1221 – 1.8877 1.4420*** 1.1164 – 1.8626 
Part time 2a 0.7250*** 0.5891 – 0.8924 0.7217*** 0.5641 – 0.9234 0.7116*** 0.5535 – 0.9148 
Part time 3a 0.8468 0.6541 – 1.0962 0.8998 0.6637 – 1.2200 0.8791 0.6443 – 1.1996 
Capital income 1.0007*** 1.0003 – 1.0010 1.0005** 1.0000 – 1.0010 1.0006** 1.0001 – 1.0012 
Spouse income 1.0007*** 1.0003 – 1.0011 1.0008*** 1.0003 – 1.0014 1.0008*** 1.0003 – 1.0014 
Children > 7 0.6947*** 0.5810 – 0.8308 0.6317*** 0.4997 – 0.7987 0.6394*** 0.5082 – 0.8045 
Children < 7 1.1194 0.9278 – 1.3501 1.2236 0.9527 – 1.5716 1.2089 0.9382 – 1.5578 
Unmarried 1.1314 0.9516 – 1.3451 1.2604* 0.9912 – 1.6027 1.2298* 0.9777 – 1.5469 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
                                                     No heterogeneity                              Gamma heterogeneity                     Non-parametric heterogeneity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  Variable                          Hazard ratio    95% Conf. interval      Hazard ratio      95% Conf. interval     Hazard ratio      95% Conf. interval     
Nursing specialist 0.4959 0.1695 – 1.4505 0.5631 0.1561 – 2.0314 0.5115 0.1411 – 1.8540 
Leading nurseb 0.1913** 0.0527 – 0.6941 0.1403** 0.0297 – 0.6629 0.1428*** 0.0301 – 0.6775 
University hospitalc 1.8692*** 1.3396 – 2.6084 2.1959*** 1.4127 – 3.4131 2.1085*** 1.3388 – 3.2008 
County hospitalc 1.6915*** 1.2447 – 2.2989 1.7885*** 1.2109 – 2.6416 1.7241*** 1.1303 – 2.6298 
Occupancy rate 1.0401*** 1.0296 – 1.0508 1.0438*** 1.0311 – 1.0567 1.0431*** 1.0307 – 1.0556 
Beds per nurse 1.9679** 1.1613 – 3.3350 2.4792*** 1.2453 – 4.9358 2.2846*** 1.1810 – 4.4194 
Length of stay 0.8144*** 0.7099 – 0.9343 0.7953*** 0.6709 – 0.9428 0.8050*** 0.6808 – 0.9528 
Number of beds 0.9083*** 0.8595 – 0.9599 0.8674*** 0.8046 – 0.9350 0.8662*** 0.8049 – 0.9321 
Centrality level 1d 0.7651 0.5405 – 1.0829 0.6906 0.4438 – 1.0746 0.7398 0.4569 – 1.1980 
Centrality level 2d 0.6017*** 0.4321 – 0.8380 0.5442*** 0.3575 – 0.8284 0.5839** 0.3735 – 0.9128 
Centrality level 3d 1.1480 0.8293 – 1.5892 1.3483 0.8851 – 2.0539 1.4235 0.9190 – 2.2051 
Log Likelihood -4404.03 -4396.21 -4395.60 
Reference categories: a) Full time, b) Staff nurse, c) Local hospital and d) Centrality level 4. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Baseline hazard functions. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Estimated baseline hazard, individuals at risk, exits and censoring, by period. 
Period At risk Exits Censored Baseline hazard Z-values 
1 5284 84 73 -7.107 -6.601 
2 5127 54 30 -7.499 -6.935 
3 5043 102 88 -6.828 -6.363 
4 4853 64 35 -7.230 -6.719 
5 4754 58 38 -7.159 -6.588 
6 4658 44 33 -7.404 -6.785 
7 4581 91 74 -6.633 -6.148 
8 4416 76 32 -6.749 -6.238 
9 4309 39 37 -7.440 -6.579 
10 4233 19 25 -8.128 -7.080 
11 4094 44 51 -7.269 -6.435 
12 3999 39 23 -7.349 -6.499 
13 3937 29 21 -7.488 -6.461 
14 3887 24 21 -7.654 -6.581 
15 3842 29 34 -7.445 -6.420 
16 3779 10 8 -8.489 -7.123 
17 3761 15 11 -8.080 -6.748 
18 3735 4 11 -9.394 -7.368 
19 3720 10 12 -8.474 -6.972 
20 3698 19 12 -7.817 -6.569 
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